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ARGUMENT 
I. 
MEMORANDUM DECISIONS OP THE TRIAL COURT LEAVE ALL OP 
THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFFS SUBJECT TO REVIEW 
The broad manner in which the trial court granted plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment necessitates appellate review of 
several issues. The defendant Chadaz calls the court's attention 
to the first Memorandum Decision issued by the District Court, 
attached to defendant Chadaz's Brief as Addendum "E". This 
decision states: 
"Without reciting all of the issues and the basis 
for decision, the court acknowledges that perhaps holding 
the Wade case (In the matter of the estate of Collin 
Thompson v. Wade. 509 NE 2nd 309 (New York 1987)) is not 
entirely justified, but neither is the defendant's 
reliance helpful. *Stranger to the deed' principles are 
not particularly beneficial to either party." (emphasis 
added). 
"For the other reasons stated in the plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment the same is granted." 
The defendant Chadaz's interpretation of this was that the Motion 
for Summary Judgment was granted for all of the reasons set forth 
in the plaintiff's Motion (except the "stranger to the deed" 
principles). 
The last paragraph of the second Memorandum Decision issued by 
the District Court attached to Chadaz's Brief as Addendum "F", 
contains the following statement: 
"As stated in the court's original Memorandum Decision 
the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the plaintiffs 
is granted and this Memorandum Decision will serve only 
as a supplement thereto." (emphasis added) 
VThile the second Memorandum Decision is helpful, it does not limit 
the broad statement made in the original decision "For the other 
reasons set forth in the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
the same is granted." This does not limit the court7s holding to 
just those issues elaborated upon in the second Memorandum Opinion, 
but is broad enough to include all of the other reasons set forth 
in plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, except the "stranger to 
the deed" principles. 
Therefore, the defendant Chadaz does not agree with the 
conclusions of the plaintiffs Potters set forth in the balance of 
the Issues for Review in Potters' Brief. 
II. 
DEFENDANT DISAGREES WITH PLAINTIFF'S 
"STATEMENT OF THE FACTS" 
The "Statement of the Facts" provided by plaintiffs contains 
improper argument, is not entirely accurate and somewhat 
misleading. The specific paragraphs of concern are as follows: 
1. In response to paragraph 2 it is Chadaz's position that 
pursuant to the original agreement (Chadaz's Addendum "A") the 
Warranty Deed shown as Potters7 Addendum No. 1 was executed 
conveying title to Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc., 
a Utah corporation. Trustee, pursuant to a Trust Agreement dated 
the 12th day of May, 1980. (emphasis added). This property was to 
be held by Hillam as Trustee not to be released except in 
accordance with the Trust Agreement. 
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2. In response to plaintiffs Potters' paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 
7, Chadaz calls attention to the fact that although the deed is 
dated October 24, 1980, it was not recorded until December 9, 1980 
which was after the Supplemental Agreement (Chadaz Addendum "B") 
dated November 25, 1980. It was also recorded at the same time 
(being the instrument immediately preceding) as the Special 
Warranty Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. to Villatek (Chadaz's 
Addendum "D"). It is this Special Warranty Deed that contains the 
provision "subject to a right of way over the East 66 feet of said 
property for the purpose of a proposed road". Contrary to Potters' 
position, this road would benefit Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (had 
they not defaulted in their Contract of Purchase) in that it would 
have given them direct access from Main Street to the balance of 
the property to which the road would lead. It would also benefit 
Chadaz for the reason that if the Buyers defaulted and the property 
be returned to Chadaz (which is, in fact, what happened) Chadaz 
would have access from Main Street to the balance of their property 
which was and is prime development property. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that the recorded deed simply refers to property 
being sold subject to the 66 foot right of way for the purpose of 
a proposed road. The Supplemental Agreement elaborates upon the 
fact that the road is to be completed by a given date and other 
improvements are to be made. It is Chadaz's position that these 
are contractual rights which Chadaz could have enforced against the 
buyers and that, in fact, the reservation of the right of way was 
for adequate consideration and was recorded and was not conditioned 
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upon the other contractual provisions set forth in the Supplemental 
Agreement being completed, 
3. In response to paragraph 8, defendant Chadaz does not deny 
that the Supplemental Agreement (Chadaz Addendum "B") was not 
recorded but Chadaz does dispute that Heritage Park Partners had 
already sold the 1.58 acres to Heritage Park Plaza before the 
Supplemental Agreement was signed. As set forth above, although 
the deeds were dated October 24, 1980, they were not, in fact, 
recorded until December 9, 1980, which was after the signing of the 
Supplemental Agreement. There was also no sale between Heritage 
Park Partners and Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., but rather simply a 
transfer of property from one entity to another entity owned by the 
same parties. This is entirely consistent with the Supplemental 
Agreement and the deeds which were, in fact, recorded after the 
Supplemental Agreement was signed. 
4. In response to Potters' paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 
it is defendant Chadaz's position that these documents speak for 
themselves and Chadaz does not agree with any conclusions reached 
by the Potters. 
5. In response to Potters' paragraph 14, it is Chadaz's 
position that the fact that the title company and/or Potters did 
not discover the easement is not the fault of Chadaz and once the 
easement was recorded it was constructive notice to the world of 
its existence. This was recognized by the title insurance company 
which had failed to list the easement on their title policy and 
subsequently paid the title insurance benefits to Potters (see 
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Chadaz Brief at pages 31 and 32 and Potters' Addendum 9). 
6. In response to Potters' paragraph 15, it is Chadaz's 
position that once the right of way was recorded the fact that the 
subsequent grantors did not include the right of way in their 
deeds, does not affect the validity of said right of way. 
7. in response to Potters' paragraph 16, Chadaz disagrees 
completely with the conclusions set forth therein. (See R. at p. 
83, paragraph 7, Verified Objections of Defendant Reta Chadaz to 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
8. In response to Potter's paragraph 17, Chadaz specifically 
denies these allegations. (See R. at p. 83 paragraph 5). 
9. In response to Potter's paragraph 18, Chadaz denies these 
allegations. (See R. at p. 100, paragraph No. 4, also shown as 
Potters' Addendum 13). 
10. In response to Potters' paragraph 19, it is Chadaz's 
position that whether or not there are other accesses to the Chadaz 
property it is irrelevant to the issues before the court. The 
Potter property shown on Potters' Addendum 12 is shown as two 
separate parcels. The east parcel which is adjacent to the Fronk 
Chevrolet property was purchased from Jay Dee Harris Truck and 
Equipment. It is this parcel (82 feet in width) upon which 
Potters' building and improvements have been built. (Tr. p. 40 In. 
3-9) . The west property is the property that was purchased from 
Bywater (67 feet in width) and is where the disputed right of way 
is located. This property is presently used as Potters' driveway. 
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(Tr. at p. 24 In. 19-24; also Tr. at p. 32 In 5-6)- The 
representation that the Bywater property separates the Potter 
property from the Chadaz property to the south is only partially 
true. The easement that was, in fact, reserved runs the entire 
distance from Main Street to the Chadaz property, including the 
property that is owned by Bywater; the importance of this being 
that Chadaz does have the right of way which abuts to the remaining 
property of Chadaz. 
11. In response to Potters' paragraph 20, it is Chadaz's 
position that the right of way in question became a matter of 
record on December 9, 1980 when it was recorded and has remained a 
recorded right of way since that date. 
12. In response to Potter's paragraph 21, Chadaz obtained the 
Quit Claim Deed for the purpose of showing that Chadaz was the real 
party in interest since Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. had defaulted in 
the purchase of the property and the recorded easement did, in 
fact, belong to Chadaz. 
III. 
CHADAZ IS NOT A "STRANGER TO THE DEED" 
Plaintiffs go to great lengths in their efforts to convince 
the court that "stranger to the deed" principles should be applied 
to prevent Chadaz7s claimed easement. In so doing, the plaintiffs 
Potters rely upon the case of Johnson v. Peck, (63 P.2nd 251, Utah, 
1936) hereinafter referred to as the Johnson case and the case of 
In the Matter of the Estate of Thomson v. Wade, (69 N.Y.2nd 570, 
516 N.Y. Supp. 2nd 614; 509 N.E.2nd 309 New York 1987) hereinafter 
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referred to as the Wade case. 
It is the defendant Chadaz7s position that neither the Johnson 
case nor the Wade case applies and both can be distinguished from 
our case. In addition to the arguments in her brief (see Brief of 
Appellant, p. 11 par. 8 and pps. 22-28), Chadaz notes the following 
distinctions between this case and the Johnson and Wade cases. 
In the Johnson case the two lots involved were originally both 
owned by "Baird". One lot was sold (later claimed to be the 
dominant parcel) without mention of any easement. (In the case 
this was the Johnson lot) . Later "Baird" sold the other lot (later 
claimed to be the servient parcel) and in the deed of conveyance 
attempted to reserve a 12 foot right of way to the property to the 
west (Johnson lot). The court held that since Baird had no right 
or interest in the land to the west, having conveyed it away two 
years before, the recital in the deed could not vest any right of 
easement in a stranger to the deed. The point being "Baird", the 
common grantor of both lots, had no interest in the west lot 
(Johnson lot) when he attempted to reserve the right of way to it. 
It is the position of Chadaz that there is no "stranger to the 
deed" in this case. The trial court in its first Memorandum 
Decision (Chadaz Addendum "E") stated: "Stranger to the deed 
principals are not particularly beneficial to either party." In 
this case the reservation of the right of way was first made in the 
deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (grantor) to Villatek, Inc. 
(see Chadaz Addendum "D") . At the time of this conveyance the 
grantor owned the property being sold to Villatek (servient parcel) 
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and also had a legally enforceable contract to purchase the 
property to which the right of way would benefit (dominant parcel). 
Chadaz still owned a security interest in the dominant parcel 
subject to the right of way of Heritage Park, Inc., formerly 
Heritage Park Partners, to purchase said property (see Potters' 
Addendum 1 where grantee was Hillam Abstracting and Insurance 
Agency, Inc., a Utah corporation, Trustee pursuant to a Trust 
Agreement dated the 12th day of May, 1980) . (See also Chadaz 
Addendum "A"). The servient parcel was owned by Heritage Park 
Plaza, Inc., formerly Heritage Park Partners but with a direct 
contract obligation to Chadaz to reserve the right of way in 
question. (See Chadaz Addendum "B" paragraph 4) . It is noted that 
both Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., formerly Heritage Park Partners, 
and Chadaz had an interest in both the servient parcel and the 
dominant parcel. Heritage Park Plaza, formerly Heritage Park 
Partners, as buyers and Chadaz as seller until the contract had 
been paid in full. The right of way served the interests of both 
parties. 
In both the Johnson case and the Wade case the grantors, who 
attempted to reserve the right of way for the dominant tenant, no 
longer had any interest in the dominant parcel which the right of 
way would benefit. Accordingly, both cases are distinguished from 
this case, and neither should be applied to prevent Chadaz's 
easement. 
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IV. 
PLAINTIFFS ARE CHARGED WITH CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE 
Plaintiffs set forth eight specific reasons why they should 
not be charged with constructive notice of Chadaz's easement. As 
set forth below, none of these reasons should relieve plaintiffs 
from being charged with constructive notice. 
1. Reason 1; It is Chadaz's position that the Potters had 
constructive notice of the reservation of the disputed easement 
from the time of the recording of the Special Warranty Deed which 
was recorded December 9, 1980 (see Chadaz Addendum "D"; see also 
Brief of Appellant Chadaz at pp. 12 and 13). 
2. Reason 2; The fact that the title company did not find 
the easement (which had been recorded) does not affect defendant 
Chadaz's position. To the contrary, the title company did, in 
fact, make payments to Potters under the provisions of the title 
policies for failure to disclose said easement. (See Chadaz Brief 
pp. 31-32; see also record at pp. 152-153; and Policy of Title 
Insurance of American Title Insurance Company, Potters7 Addendum 
9). 
3. Reason 3: It is Chadaz's position that the Special 
Warranty Deed (Chadaz7s Addendum "D") speaks for itself. There is 
nothing in the deed that refers to a completion date for the road, 
nor does there need to be. 
4. Reason 4; It is Chadaz's position that Chadaz does not 
need to be a party to this Agreement. Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. 
(formerly Heritage Park Partners) was fulfilling a binding 
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obligation to Chadaz by making the deed subject to the easement. 
The deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was simply a continued 
fulfillment of that obligation and to place record title to the 
easement in Chadaz. Upon reasonable inquiry concerning the 
easement, the Potters could have easily determined the actual 
ownership of the recorded easement. 
5. Reason 5; It is the position of Chadaz that this is 
irrelevant. 
6. Reason 6: (See Maurice Staples' Affidavit, Potters 
Addendum 13) placing these facts in issue. 
7. Reason 7: It is the position of Chadaz that once the 
easement was recorded and made a matter of record, it was notice to 
the world and there would be a duty of inquiry upon any purchaser 
of the property, which inquiry would have easily determined the 
provisions of the supplemental contract. It is Chadaz's further 
position that the provisions of said contract are not necessary and 
the recorded deed speaks for itself. 
8. Reason 8: It is the position of Chadaz that the fact that 
no plat maps or street plans show the easement does not affect the 
validity of the recorded easement. 
In addition to the eight reasons listed by plaintiffs, they 
also rely upon the Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Savings 
and Loan Association case (739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987)). Their 
reliance of Potter on this case is misplaced. In the Diversified 
case the trust deed relied upon had been reconveyed on the record. 
In our case the document creating the easement has never been 
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released of record. Chadaz relies on the recorded document as 
actual or constructive notice. The complicated facts of the 
Diversified case are clearly distinguishable from our case. 
V. 
THE EASEMENT WAS NEITHER ABANDONED NOR TERMINATED 
Plaintiffs also argue that Chadaz's easement was abandoned or 
terminated. Defendant Chadaz relies on her original Brief in 
response to plaintiffs Potters' argument on this point. (See 
Chadaz's original Brief, p. 28, par. B.). 
In addition, and contrary to Potters7 argument that " . . . the 
easement was only to be created by Villatek, Inc. constructing a 
road . . .", it is the position of Chadaz that the right of way was 
for the benefit of Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (formerly Heritage 
Park Partners), if it, in fact, completed purchase of the property. 
It was to the benefit of Chadaz if the purchase was not completed. 
It was also to the benefit of any subsequent purchaser if the 
property was sold to them for the reason that it would be a benefit 
in the development of said property. It is Chadaz's position that 
dominant and servient parcels still abut each other. (See Chadaz's 
original Brief pp. 13-15). 
VI. 
CHADAZ IS NOT BARRED FROM AN EASEMENT 
BY EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
The easement in this case is a recorded easement. It is not 
a prescriptive easement. Based upon the arguments set forth in 
Chadaz's original Brief, pp. 17-19, par. E. and pp. 30-31, par. D., 
there is certainly a genuine issue as to these material facts on 
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this point. The trial court indicated that "at least five of your 
(Potters) issues are equitable factors all of which are always fact 
sensitive." (See Tr. p. 5. In. 22 and 23). Chadaz agrees with this 
statement and contends that these material facts must be determined 
before a ruling could be properly made on this point. 
CONCLUSION 
"When reviewing a summary judgment the party against whom the 
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all of the facts 
presented, and inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in 
the light most favorable to him." Applying this standard of review 
to the facts of this case it is clear that summary judgment was 
improper. Accordingly, this case should be remanded to the trial 
court for a trial on its merits. 
DATED this i^ - day of <Q>to^W 1998. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Correction of errors discovered in Brief of Appellant. 
ADDENDUM 1 
ADDENDUM 1 
CORRECTION OP ERRORS DISCOVERED IN "BRIEF OF APPELLANT" 
It has come to appellant's attention that the "BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT" previously filed by her, contains two (2) typographical 
errors which should be corrected. The first appears on page 1, 
just below the middle of the page, in the sentence which reads: 
"When reviewing a summary judgment the party against 
whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have 
all of the facts presented, and all of the inferences 
fairly arising therefrom, considered in the light not 
favorable to him". (underlining added) 
The word "not" should be replaced with the word "most" so that 
the sentence would read: 
"When reviewing a summary judgment the party against 
whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have 
all of the facts presented, and all of the inferences 
fairly arising therefrom, considered in the light most 
favorable to him". (underlining added) 
The second error is found on page 19, in the fourth line from 
the top. The year "1998" should be the year "1993", so that the 
correct date reads: July 23, 1993. 
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